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sion, stated that “the standard of care identified in this
article has not been imposed by a court of law. It is the
standard of care developed by geneticists and physicians.
Debate as to its ‘reasonableness’ will have to be resolved
by the medical genetics community” (Sharpe 1994a).
NEIL F. SHARPE
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Reply to Sharpe
To the Editor:
Mr. Sharpe correctly notes that in our article (Fitzpatrick
et al. 1999) he was credited for considering the existence
of a physician’s duty of care toward patients (Sharpe
1994). His comments in this regard were indeed made
in the context of Huntington disease, but, as we did not
attribute to him any opinion on the duty to recontact,
his position on this subject was not misrepresented, but
simply omitted, from our discussion. We apologize to
Mr. Sharpe and thank him for clarifying his position.
The intention of our article was to report and discuss
original research findings and not to present a detailed
analysis of medical principles and legal obligations as-
sociated with a theoretical duty to recontact. It was our
hope that our article would stimulate such a discourse,
and we thank Mr. Sharpe for his insightful comments.
JENNIFER L. FITZPATRICK AND MARLENE J. HUGGINS
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation
Hamilton, Ontario
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The Choice to Have a Disabled Child
To the Editor:
What are the purposes of genetic testing, what are the
principles guiding its use, and who should decide what
tests should be available for what purposes? These fa-
miliar questions are raised in an unfamiliar context by
a study reported recently in this journal (Middleton et
al. 1998). Attitudes toward genetic testing were assessed
among deaf people attending a conference in the United
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Kingdom on issues concerning deaf people. About half
the sample thought that genetic testing did more harm
than good and that its potential use devalued deaf peo-
ple. These attitudes were more negative than those pre-
viously reported in the general population (Michie et al.
1995). Attitudes were also more negative among those
who identified equally with the deaf and hearing
communities.
Of those who were interested in prenatal testing for
deafness, a small proportion (4/14) said they would pre-
fer to have deaf children. Out of the whole sample, 13/
87 participants said they would prefer to have deaf chil-
dren. This raises the possibility that some deaf people
may consider using genetic technology to facilitate their
having deaf children. Caution, however, is needed in
interpreting these findings. The study sample was both
small and likely to be unrepresentative of deaf people
in that it comprised those attending an international con-
ference. In addition, participants completed the ques-
tionnaires in a highly unusual social context: a confer-
ence auditorium, surrounded by mainly deaf delegates,
at a conference about aspects of deafness entitled “The
Deaf Nation.” Two factors may have led to responses
different from those that might have been given in the
context of everyday living. The first factor is that the
identity of being a deaf person may have been accen-
tuated, temporarily, by being in a group of deaf people
discussing deaf issues. Social categorization theory sug-
gests that this is likely to increase the difference between
the views of those within the group and the views of
those not in the group (Turner and Oakes 1989). The
second factor is social comparison, the perception of
how others are likely to respond (Suls and Miller 1977).
The views of individuals in a group have been found to
shift in the direction of the group’s views in order to
gain approval and avoid disapproval. The social context
within which the questionnaire was completed is illus-
trated here: “A Deaf chairwoman who introduced the
question)[informed] delegates that they could make a
difference to genetic services for deaf people, if they com-
pleted the questionnaire, or could exercise their right to
refuse, by ignoring it” (Middleton et al. 1998, p. 1176).
Even if the attitudes reported are valid, attitudes
should not be confused with behavior. What people say
does not always indicate what they will do. For example,
a majority of those at risk of Huntington disease said
they would have a genetic test when it became available,
yet only a small proportion underwent the test when it
did become available (Bundey 1997). Similar findings
have been found for predictive testing for cancers in both
Europe and the United States (Lerman et al. 1996; Du-
dok de Wit et al. 1997).
With these caveats in mind, the finding that people
affected by a condition have more-positive attitudes to-
ward it than do others and also hold more-negative at-
titudes toward prenatal testing is supported by a large
body of psychological literature. This literature shows
that people with different experiences and perspectives
(affected versus not affected, health professional versus
lay) perceive the same condition differently: those with
a condition very often perceive it as less serious than do
those without the condition. For example, those found
to have raised levels of cholesterol perceive this as less
serious than do those with results in the normal range
(Croyle et al. 1993). Parents of children with a chronic
disease perceive that condition as less serious than do
parents of children with other chronic diseases (Marteau
and Johnston 1986).More than 80% of parents consider
that their children with Down syndrome are well ac-
cepted by society, in contrast with 4% of physicians
(Pueschel et al. 1986). Fewer offspring with cystic fi-
brosis (CF), when compared with their parents, perceive
termination of pregnancy for CF as acceptable (Conway
et al. 1994).
There are several possible explanations for this phe-
nomenon of different experiences resulting in different
perceptions. There is no evidence that these differences
reflect differences in knowledge. They may, however, re-
flect a difference in the information available to indi-
viduals when asked to make a judgement (Tversky and
Kahneman 1973): those living with a condition have
available to them many more examples of the condition
not being serious than do those not living with it. This
phenomenon may also reflect minimization, a common
and effective strategy for dealing with the emotions
evoked by threat. In contrast to denial, there is evidence
to suggest that such a strategy does not undermine prac-
tical attempts to solve a problem (Croyle et al. 1993).
How, then, should individuals be helped to make de-
cisions about genetic testing, given these differing per-
spectives? There are several options. The authors suggest
that those with a particular disability be treated by coun-
selors who share that disability. To leave aside the prac-
tical problems that this would involve—requiring sets of
counselors for every disease and disability—such a so-
lution privileges the views of the affected over those of
the unaffected. Would parents make better decisions if
counseled by one of the 20% of the culturally Deaf who
favors the birth of deaf children than if counseled by a
genetic counselor who may hold less-positive views of
deafness?
Another option is to give parents the choice to meet
others with different experiences of, and, hence, different
perspectives on, an issue. Although this latter option
appears in recent guidelines in the United Kingdom on
prenatal counseling (Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists and Royal College of Paediatrics and
Child Health 1997), evidence is needed to determine the
consequences, which may be counterintuitive. Presenting
disability in a positive light may not result in more pos-
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itive attitudes. In a recent study that compared the im-
pacts of positive and negative images of children with
Down syndrome, we found that presenting a photo-
graph, regardless of whether it presented a positive or
a negative image, generated more concern about the con-
dition than presenting no photograph (Figueiras et al.,
in press). There is an urgent need to evaluate the cog-
nitive, emotional, and behavioral consequences of dif-
ferent types of information, presented using differentme-
dia and by those with different levels of experience in
living with a condition.
Another important question is raised by this paper:
What constitutes a legitimate request for prenatal genetic
testing? Answering this raises other questions concerning
the objectives of prenatal testing: Whose interests does
prenatal testing serve, and what constitutes a disability?
The authors state that some deaf persons may consider
prenatal testing in order to have deaf children. This
raises two conflicts. One concerns the objectives of pre-
natal testing. Is it meant to reduce disability, in which
case requests for testing to ensure deaf children should
not be met, or is it to offer choice, in which case such
requests should be met? Views about this issue differ
even among professionals in the United Kingdom. Public
health specialists put more emphasis on reducing disa-
bility (e.g., Royal College of Physicians 1989), whereas
the genetics community emphasizes autonomous choice
(e.g., Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1993). There is also
a potential conflict between the choice of parents and
the opportunities and quality of life of the child in a
predominantly hearing society. Parents’ and children’s
interests may not always coincide. With the increased
control provided by new genetic technologies, there is a
need to ensure the widest participation of social groups
in decisions about implementation. The interests of
groups beyond users and providers should be incorpo-
rated, since such decisions not only reflect a society’s
values but, in turn, may help to shape them.
Prenatal selection for deafness has been discussed in
relation to prenatal gender selection in that both are
examples of using technology to “seek out and destroy”
a “normal” fetus (D. C. Wertz, personal communica-
tion). Wertz reports widespread feeling among both ge-
neticists and parents that this is a misuse of genetic tech-
nology. She suggests that it perverts the goals of medicine
in order to satisfy special interests. The goals of medicine
are defined as helping people to live to the fullest extent
possible. This begs the question of what special interests
are and why meeting them should not be a goal of med-
icine. Who defines what “living to the fullest extent pos-
sible” is? Some deaf parents may consider that the social
advantages of sharing a Deaf culture within the family
and the Deaf community outweigh the biological limi-
tation of not hearing.
Wertz reports that the majority of 409 U.S. patients
surveyed believe that a doctor should honor a parent’s
request for prenatal diagnosis in order to have a deaf
child or a child of a specified gender (55% and 59%,
respectively; D. C. Wertz, personal communication).
Other surveys in the United States and Europe show that
a proportion of the public is in favor of prenatal testing
and selective termination for a range of conditions not
considered to be diseases. For example, 25% of 147 U.S.
students agreed with prenatal testing at least in some
circumstances for short stature (Milner et al. 1998), and
10% of 973 citizens of the United Kingdom thought
that prenatal testing with the option of termination
should be available for two missing fingers (Michie et
al. 1995). A 1994 U.S. survey of 1,000 members of the
public and 1,084 geneticists asked whether requests for
prenatal testing for gender selection should be met: just
over one-third of respondees said “yes” (Wertz and
Fletcher 1998). There was a belief among both geneti-
cists and patients that withholding any service is a denial
of patients’ rights. However, there are considerable dif-
ferences between geneticists in different countries, with
only 8%–14% of U.K. geneticists agreeing that such
requests should be met (a similar figure to the 16% of
Middleton’s sample of deaf citizens of the United King-
dom who said they would consider prenatal testing for
deafness). In other countries, the figure ranged from 0%
(in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Egypt) to 90% (in
Russia). Again, we should remind ourselves that these
surveys only report attitudes. We do not know how such
requests are actually met.
The extent to which people consider a condition to
be serious depends on their culture, socioeconomic
status, religion, and personal experience. These factors
may differ both within a society and among different
societies. In Wertz’s 1994 survey, reasons given by ge-
neticists for their views varied, with Western nations
emphasizing personal autonomy and China and India
emphasizing social consequences (Wertz 1995). One
framework for making judgements about the use of ge-
netic technology is not necessarily superior to another:
they are different, shaped by each society’s historical,
cultural, and material circumstances. These circum-
stances determine what is beneficial and what is harmful,
what is socially responsible and irresponsible, and what
is autonomy. This applies to different societies as well
as to different cultural and social groups within any
society.
This letter started with the questions “What are the
purposes of genetic testing, what are the principles guid-
ing its use, and who should decide what tests should be
available for what purposes?” Answers cannot be ab-
solute, but must depend on the particular context within
which a technology is being developed and applied. A
combination of discussion, research, and developing
frameworks for judgment would seem to be necessary
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ingredients for the constructive development of thought
and action in introducing new technologies. This is par-
ticularly the case for genetic tests used for prenatal di-
agnosis and selective termination of pregnancies.
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Reply to Michie and Marteau
To the Editor:
Michie and Marteau (1999 [in this issue]) make some
valid points in relation to our article on attitudes toward
genetic testing for deafness (Middleton et al. 1998).
However, they also make some criticisms that we would
like to take the opportunity to answer. Michie and Mar-
teau point out that the study sample is likely to be un-
representative of deaf people. It was acknowledged in
our article that the study sample was biased. In fact, a
culturally biased sample was chosen deliberately, since
it was cultural attitudes that were of interest. Another
criticism in their letter is that “participants completed
the questionnaires in a highly unusual social context.”
Again, it was acknowledged in our article that the “re-
sponses may have been influenced by the context within
which the questionnaire was distributed,” and “social
desirability bias” was cited as a possible confounding
factor. The article was the result of a pilot study that,
together with other pilot work, contributed to the design
of a larger study that has ascertained the attitudes of
1,600 deaf, hard-of-hearing, or deafened adults and
